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Abstract
We examine the dynamic e¤ects of an oil price shock on a small open economy that imports oil and
exports labor to the oil exporting countries. We nd that the reduction in output resulting from the oil
price shock is at least partially mitigated by an accompanying increase in remittances from the expatriated
labor. We also show that with a jump in oil price, domestic labor use decreases and labor export increases,
oil consumption falls, and steady-state capital and consumption fall. However, consumption may intially
jump up depending on the relative sizes of the negative supply e¤ect and the positive remittance e¤ect.
Although consumption will eventually fall below the pre-shock level as steady state is approached, the initial
consumption increase may be su¢ ciently large and long lasting to make the shock scenario welfare improving.
JEL Classication: O12, O16, J23, J43, D13, D52
Keywords:Oil Price Shock, Remittances, Economic Welfare
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1 Introduction
Can an oil importing country benet from an oil price shock? In this paper we try to answer this
question and derive conditions under which this can happen. The oil price shocks of 1973 and 1979, and the
consequent recessions in the United States and other developed countries prompted researchers to examine
the e¤ects of the shocks on the macroeconomy more rigorously. Researchers agree that an oil price shock is
a negative supply shock but recently, some authors (for example, Barsky and Kilian, 2004) have argued that
the magnitude of the e¤ects of an oil price shock becomes smaller and the shock loses some of its power to
drive down the economies of the developed countries as the oil content of these economies decreases. In a
recent comprehensive study, Blanchard and Gali (2007) argue that the e¤ects of an oil shocks are di¤erent
today than they were in 1970s, due to a number of factors including better monetary policy, more exible
labor markets, and lower oil content in production. On the other hand, some authors (for example, Hamilton,
2003) argue that even though the oil content in modern economies is decreasing steadily, the oil shock can
create negative expectations e¤ect and thus have a large macroeconomic impact. Researchers have found
similar impacts in developing countries (see Mitra,1995). Oil prices remain a sensitive issue in political
discourse in the US and in many other countries.
It is also interesting to note that as higher oil prices signicantly increased national incomes in the
oil exporting countries (most of which were developing countries before the 1970s), a huge expansion of
consumption took place in those countries. Consumption of traded and nontraded good increased dramati-
cally along with the emergence of a construction boom. As a result, a large number of skilled and unskilled
workers from the neighboring developing countries migrated to the oil-rich countries and have been working
in traded and nontraded sectors. Since the immigration policies of the oil-rich countries are restrictive, the
migrant workers had to keep close ties to their home countries and send as much money as possible back
home. This created large remittance ows in the late 1970s that continue to date. Researchers have ex-
amined extensively the e¤ects of remittances on the economic growth and welfare of the recipient countries
(e.g., Lucas and Stark, 1985; Ilahi and Jafarey, 1999; Chami, Fullenkamp, and Jahjah, 2005, Giuliano and
Ruiz-Arranz, 2005). It is also observed that when oil prices increase in the world market, the remittances
ows from the oil-rich countries increase signicantly (Lueth and Ruiz-Arranz, 2007).
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We incorporate the remittance response as well as the output response to an increase in oil price in
an intertemporal optimizing model of a small, oil importing, labor exporting country. Oil, along with capital
and labor, is a productive input in the importing country. We show that an increase in the price of oil will
reduce the steady-state capital in the country and thus a negative supply shock will be realized. However,
the movement of consumption rates depends on a host of factors including production structure (specically,
oil intensity of the production process), elasticity of the oil demand, and also oil price sensitivity of the
wage rate in the oil exporting countries. We derive conditions under which oil price shock can be welfare
improving for an oil importing country!
2 The Model
We construct an intertemporal optimizing model of two countries. Both countries are small open economies,
one country imports oil and exports labor, and the other country does the opposite. We analyze the e¤ects of
an oil price shock and consequent changes in the remittance ow on growth and welfare of the oil importing
country. We assume that labor is perfectly mobile between oil exporting and labor exporting countries.
Later we dicuss potential remications of imperfect mobility of labor.
2.1 Oil Exporting Country
We assume that the rms in the oil exporting country use only imported labor (Lm) to extract oil, using a
concave production function f(Lm); and they maximize their prots. Total prot from oil production is
 = pf(Lm)  wLm (1)
where p is the price of oil, w is the wage rate. The rst order condition to maximize the prot is
pfLm(Lm) = w (2)
which would yield the demand for labor curve in the oil exporting country.
2.2 Labor Exporting Country
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The representative household in the labor exporting country maximizes the following utility function
1Z
0
U(C)e tdt (3)
The household uses capital, labor, and oil as inputs to produce output, using a concave production
function, F (K;L;N): L is the fraction of labor used in domestic production (the remaining, Lm = 1  L is
the fraction sent to work in the oil exporting country), K is the capital stock, and N is the amount of oil used
in production: Thus, wLm is the total amount of remittances in each period. The total income (dometic
production plus remittances) is used for consumption, payments for oil import, and to create additional
capital. Thus, the capital accumulation equation is:
_K = F (K;L;N)  C   pN + wLm (4)
Consumption C includes consumption by household members both at home and abroad.
The Hamiltonian for this problem is
H = U(C)e t + e t (F (K;L;N)  C   pN + w(1  L)) (5)
The optimality conditions are
UC =  (6)
FL(K;L;N) = w = pfLm(Lm) (7)
FN (K;L;N) = p (8)
FK(K;L;N) =   
_

(9)
and the transversality condition is
Ltt!1Ke t = 0 (10)
3
Now using equations (8) and (7) we can derive L and N as functions of K and p.
L = L(K; p) (11)
and
N = N(K; p) (12)
Taking total di¤erential of equations (7) and (8), we derive the following

FLL + pfLmLm FNL
FNL FNN

dL
dN

=
  FLK fLm
 FNK 1

dK
dP

(13)
where
D =
 FLL + pfLmLm FNLFNL FNN

It can be shown that D > 0. From (13), we obtain:
dN
dp
=
1
D
(FLL + pfLmLm   fLmFLN ) < 0
dL
dp
=
1
D
(fLmFNN   FLN ) < 0
dN
dK
=
1
D
( FNK(FLL + pfLmLm) + FLKFLN ) > 0 (14)
dL
dK
=
1
D
( FKLFNN + FLNFNK) > 0
These results are as expected. dN=dp < 0 implies a downward sloping oil demand curve. Also, when
the oil price increases, the return from working abroad increases, and therefore, the labor exporting country
exports more labor and uses less labor in home production, thus yielding dL=dp < 0. In addition, since all
inputs in the production function of the labor exporting country are complementary inputs, an increase in
capital will increase the marginal productivity of both labor and oil use and thus more of these two factors
will be used in production, i.e., dN=dK; dL=dK > 0:
2.3 Macroeconomic Equilibrium
Using equation (6), we can derive the following
UCC _C
UC
=
_

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and using equation (9), we obtain
_C =
UC
UCC
(   FK(K;L;N)) (15)
We also have
_K = F (K;L;N)  C   pN + w(1  L) (16)
At steady state _C = _K = 0. Since L and N are functions of K and p, we derive the steady state
values of K ( ~K) and C ( ~C) from (16) and (15) for a given value of p.
2.3.1 Steady-state Responses
The steady-state relationships are
 = FK( ~K;L( ~K; p); N( ~K; p)) (17)
and
F ( ~K;L( ~K; p); N( ~K; p)) + FL( ~K;L( ~K; p); N( ~K; p))(1  L( ~K; p)) = ~C + pN( ~K; p) (18)
Equation (17) imply that in equilibrium the marginal product of capital should be equal to the
exogenously given rate of time preference. The equation (18) shows the long-run goods market clearing
condition. For a given value of the price of oil p, equation (17) yields the equilibrium values of ~K and we
use this ~K to get the equilibrium values of ~C from equation (18).
In order to examine the e¤ects of a permanent increase in the oil price on equilibrium ~K, we totally
di¤erentiate equations (17,18) and obtain the following
@ ~K
@p
=
 (FKL @L@p + FKN @N@p )
FKK + FKLLK + FKNNK
where
sgn(
@ ~K
@p
) = sgn(FKK + FKLLK + FKNNK)
FKK is the direct e¤ect of a change in capital on marginal product of capital (negative) where
(FKLLK + FKNNK) is the indirect e¤ect of a change in capital on the marginal product of capital through
changes in L and N (positive, since the inputs are complementary inputs in the production process), we ex-
pect that the negative direct e¤ect will dominate (it is certainly true for Cobb-Douglas production functions),
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we expect that an increase in oil price will lower the equilibrium capital stock.
In order to examine the e¤ects of a permanent increase in the oil price on equilibrium ~C, we totally
di¤erentiate equations (17,18) and obtain the following
@C^
@p
= [FK + (FLK + FLL
@L
@K
+ FLN
@N
@K
)(1  L)]@
~K
@p
 N (19)
where FLK > 0 is the direct e¤ect of a change in capital K on the marginal product of labor and
FLL
@L
@K + FLN
@N
@K is the indeirect e¤ect of K on the marginal product of labor through changes in labor
allocation L and N . Moreover, one component of this indirect e¤ect, FLN @N@K , is also positive. This implies
that the total e¤ect of an increase in capital on the marginal product of labor FLK+FLL @L@K +FLN
@N
@K would
be positive. Incorporating this result in equation (19), we can argue that
sgn(
@C^
@p
) = sgn(FKK + FKLLK + FKNNK) < 0
Thus an increase in oil price will eventually decrease the steady-state level of consumption. However,
the transitional path of consumption may include some temporary jump in consumption since higher price
of oil will increase the amount of labor allocated to the oil rich country and also the use of oil will decline.
This results in a decline in output in the oil importing country but an increase in remittances per worker
measured as the value of marginal product in the oil rich country and it would work in the opposite direction.
The net e¤ect on consumption may turn out to be positive. Labor mobility between these countries thus
may allow a temporary increase in consumption for some labor exporting countries.
2.4 Equilibrium Dynamics
Linearizing equations (15) and (16) around steady state values (C^; ~K), the dynamics of C and K can be
approximated by: 
_C
_K

=

a11 a12
a21 a22

C   ~C
K   ~K

(20)
where
a11 = 0; a12 =   UC
UCC
(FKK + FKLLK + FKNNK)
a21 =  1; a22 = FK + FNNK   pNK + (1  L) (FLK + FLLLK + FLNNK)
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Equation (20) describes a two variable linear dynamic system and the determinant of the coe¢ cient
matrix is   UCUCC (FKK + FKLLK + FKNNK). With a concave F (:), we can show that the determinant is
negative, implying that the equilbrium is a saddlepoint. Since consumption rate C is free to jump instan-
taneously and capital K is constrained to move sluggishly, so the equilibrium yields a unique stable saddle
path.
We denote the stable eigenvalue by , so that the (linearized) stable solution may be written in the
form:
C   ~C = A1et (21)
K   ~K = 
a12
A1e
t (22)
The constant A1 can be determined by inserting t = 0 in equation (22) to obtain:
A1 =
(K0   ~K)a12

3 Calibration Results
Since our production functions and utility functions are nonlinear, we conducted a numerical analysis by
adopting the following utility and production functions:
U =
1

C where  1 <  < 1 (23)
F (K;L;N) = AKLN1   (24)
f(Lm) = BL

m (25)
The simulations below are based on the following standard parameter vaules, characterizing the
benchmark economy:
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A = 1:5; B = 1:1;  = 0:06
 = 0:25;  = 0:65;  = 0:5
 =  1:5; p = 1
where 11  = 0:4 is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. The extant empirical evidence suggests
that the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is small and so our choice of parameter  =  1:5 is a
reasonable one1 . The aggregate productivity parameters for home production and production of oil exporting
country are A and B, respectively. The share of labor in home production is about 65% and the rate of
discount is chosen to be 6%. We also assume the initial oil price equal to 1. These parameters yield a
reasonable benchmark equilibrium with capital output ratio 4.17, initial labor allocation at home 86%, and
remittance to GDP ratio 11%.2
We compute steady state ratios before and after permanent oil price shocks of various magnitudes
(10%, 25%, and 50% increase in oil price), as shown in Table 1. The time paths of consumption and capital
from the initial equilibrium to the new equilibrium can then be plotted (only the consumption path is shown
in Figure 1). The consumption path allows us to compute the welfare e¤ects using (3), shown in the last
row of Table 1.
Table 1
Steady-State Responses to Permanent Oil Price Shocks
Increase inOilPrice! Benchmark 10% Increase 25% Increase 50% Increase
K
Y 4:17 4:17 4:17 4:17
L 0:861 0:826 0:767 0:645
Remit
GDP 0:105 0:137 0:198 0:358
%Change in Welfare  0:98  2:15  3:27
From this table, it is clear that an oil price increase will increase the proportion of work force mi-
grating to oil exporting countries (resulting in smaller L, the proportion left at home) and thus the ratio of
remittances over GDP increases. However, the rate of decline in welfare declines as the size of the oil price
1For detail discussion on empirical evidence please see Guvenen (2006).
2Chami et al. (2005) in their Table 2 report that the ratios of remittances and GDP for countries like Lebanon, Yemen,
Jordan, Samoa and others are above 0.16.
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shock becomes larger. Since the higher oil price yields some positive benet through higher remittances,
the welfare decline due to the supply shock is somewhat neutralized by this channel. A country with no
remittances channel would face a larger decline in welfare.
It is also important to examine the dynamic path of the rate of consumption, C, to understand the
total e¤ect of negative supply shock and positive remittances shock. The following Figure 1 shows the
dynamic path of the rate of consumption when we have oil price shock of three di¤erent sizes.
We observe that for all three shocks the long run equilibrium consumption declines and the larger
the shock, the larger is the decline. For smaller shocks, consumption jumps down to a lower level than
the pre-shock steady state consumption and then gradually further declines to new low equilibrium levels of
consumption. However, for a larger oil price shock, the consumption level jumps up a little from the pre-shock
steady state consumption and then gradually comes down to a level lower than the previous equilibrium level
of consumption. Larger the size of the shock, the larger is the overshooting of consumption. Also, as the
size of the shock becomes larger, the rate of convergence becomes smaller. For a moderate (25%) jump in oil
prices for the simulated economy, the increase in remittances outweighs the increased payment for oil and
thus we have an increase in consumption for a while. Since the long run consumption level is much lower
than the pre-shock steady state consumption and the rate of convergence is about 3.6 percent3 , we observe
a decline in welfare shown in Table 1.
3Absoulte value of the negative eigenvalue of the coe¢ cient matrix
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Figure 1
Consumption Paths in Response to the Oil Price Shocks of Di¤erent Sizes
We also conduct sensitivity analysis by allowing changes in initial parameters and computed the
welfare changes thereafter. Results are given in Table 2.
Table 2
Percentage Changes in Welfare and Changes in the Structure of Production.
Increase inOilPrice! 10% Increase 25% Increase 50% Increase
Benchmark  0:98  2:15  3:27
10%increaseA  1:016  2:286  3:780
10%increaseB  0:944  2:005  2:691
5%increase  0:640  1:417  2:217
10%increase  0:971  2:095  2:953
The results reported in Table 2 show that a smaller share of oil in the production process will yield a
smaller decline in welfare for an oil price shock of a given size. An increase in the overall productivity in the
labor exporting country will make the negative welfare e¤ect of an oil price shock more pronounced since
the proportion of labor migrating to the oil exporting country would be smaller as the marginal product of
labor at home has now been increased and the positive e¤ect through remittances would be small. However,
an overall productivity increase in the oil exporting country will have the opposite e¤ect. Then, a larger
fraction of workers will migrate. Moreover, an increase in labors share in production (a larger ) in the labor
exporting country or an increase in labors share in output in the oil exporting country (an increase in )
will yield a smaller decline in welfare. The increase in  keeping all other parameters constant is equivalent
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to reducing the contribution of oil in the production process in the labor exporting country if we have a
production function that exhibits constant returns to scale.
4 Conclusions
A sharp rise in oil price is essentially a negative supply shock. There is voluminous literature on
this topic. But the oil price increase allows the oil exporting countries to expand their output. This
generally results in an increase in expenditures on construction and other nontraded goods, accompanied by
an increased labor import that can increase remittances to the labor exporting countries. We nd signicant
literature focusing on the e¤ects of remittances on business cycle, welfare, and growth in labor exporting and
labor importing countries. However, we do not nd these two e¤ects (a negative supply e¤ect and a positive
remittances e¤ect) of an oil price increase in the same macroeconomic model. In this paper, we include both
e¤ects in a dynamic macro model. Results from our theoretical model suggest that an increase in oil price
may increase the level of consumption of a labor exporting and oil importing country for a while and then
it comes back to the long run equilibrium level which is lower than the initial level of consumption. This
allows for the possibility of a positive welfare e¤ect in response to an oil price shock.
The positive remittances e¤ect should not be limited to remittances from exporting labor. If countries
exporting capital (foreign direct investment) invest in oil exporting countries then with a production structure
that incorporates capital in the oil exporting countries would generate similar e¤ect and thus the negative
supply shock would be somewhat neutralized for the capital exporting countries. Recent weaker e¤ects of
oil price increase on the U.S. economy may have some relationship to this compensating channel.
The model also allows us to examine how the e¤ects of oil price changes may di¤er at di¤erent oil
intensities of production. This is escpecially interesting because the oil intensities in both developing and
developed countries have been changing over time. The labor mobility and oil content in the output have
been the main channel through which these e¤ects are realized. With imperfect labor mobility these results
will still hold qualitatively as we will still have to equate marginal products of labor in both countries, though
allowing for imperfect mobility.
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